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2
THE LIMITS OF PROCESS
ROBIN WEST

Jeremy Waldron's claim, as I understand it, is that the "Rule of
Law" requires not only that the various laws that govern us consist of general, knowable rules with which we can all comply-the
so-called formal requirements of the Rule of Law often identified
with Lon Fuller's notorious King Rex and his eight ways to fail
to make law 1-but also that those laws be applied in a way that
acknowledges our intelligence, respects our dignity, and broadly
tr('ats each of us as a worthy equal when it imposes its censorial
and punitive will upon us. 2 Waldron wants to think of these latter
ideals as the "procedural" requirements of the Rule of Law, which,
he claims, are not reducible to Fuller's requirements and may on
occasion conflict with them.~ So, he distinguishes the "formal"
from the "procedural" requirements of the Rule of Law. The formal, Fullerian Rule of Law requires that, whatever their content,
laws must have a certain form, while the procedural, Waldronian
Rule of Law requires that, l,owever formally virtuous they may be,
those rules must be applied in a way that is procedurally just.' The
state may not, consistent with the Rule of Law thus understood,
expose any of us to the risk of state-imposed punishment, liability, censure, or stigma without ensuring that the laws that have
this consequence are applied against us in a fair way that respects
our dignity. 5 And what does that fairness require? Minimally, that
we have the opportunity, should we be so targeted by the state,
to participate intelligently in the legal system that has brought
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down its sword upon usY Our rules of procedure should all be interpreted and applied toward that end. So, the procedural Rule
of Law requires, for example, that we be granted a fair trial, that
we be assured, at that trial, of the assistance of an attorney, and
that, through decent procedures, we have a chance to tell our side
of the story, and to do so in accordance with rules of evidence
that guarantee that only relevant information will be garnered by
the state to secure a conviction or verdict against us, rather than
any old piece of defamatory nonsense the state might feel free to
unleash.
More generally, the procedural Rule of Law requires that we
be treated as an intelligent participatory member of law's empire,
even when the state seeks to use law's sword to punish, stigmatize,
or penalize us. The formal requirements broadly associated with
Lon Fuller's work protect our interest in law's certainty and predictability and hence maximize our liberty and to some degree our
dignity-they respect, tor example, our agentic capacity to decide
to be law abiding. Such a choice is available to us only if the laws
we are being asked to abide by are in accordance more or less with
Fuller's eight formal requirements. This is not, however, sufficient,
Waldron argues, for a Rule of Law regime. Such a regime must
also be procedurally just. Again, these are not the same thing, nor
do they stem from the same core values. The procedural Rule of
Law respects not so much our liberty or our agentic capacity to
choose tor or against law abidance but rather our intelligence and
our individual perspective: decent procedure should grant us an
opportunity to participate as an equal and intelligent citizen in
the system of law that inflicts its will upon us, and to do so in a
way that allows our elaboration of our own perspective on both
the rules being applied against us and our own story about the
e\'ents that triggered the law's hand. Finally, both contrast with a
substantive understanding of the Rule of Law, argued by legal and
political philosophers as requiring a state that protects property
and contract rights and actively seeks to impose this understanding in emerging democracies interested in embracing a rule of
law. Against such substantive and formal understandings, Waldron
offers his procedural interpretation as a necessary complement.
That's the argument as I understand it.
It would be churlish to object too strenuously to this humane
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proposal to expand the Rule of Law of our imaginings to include a
procedural dimension, particularly gh·en contemporary national,
global, and political realities. We are indeed suffering a deficit
of procedural fairness in our various courts of criminal justice,
from the military commissions in Guantanamo Bay,' to the district
courts of Baltimore City/ to various points abroad. And, a growing
body of Rule of Law scholarship that is proving influential in those
countries with systems seeking to emulate our own identifies the
Rule of Law almost exclusi,·ely with the certainty and predictability
in economic life that are so beneficial to those with property: a limited and generally regressi,·e conception of legalism that protects
market-based liberties but little elseY Complementing that property-centerecl Rule of Law ideology with something that centers on
. people rather than profit can't hurl. 'vVe are also facing, although
this may be low on the list of world problems, a badly demoralized domestic law school environment. The economic pressures
on our graduates, who are facing a very pom·job market; declit1ing
or lost htith, and for good reason, among constitutional academic
lawyers that the Supreme Court will use its powers to move us toward a more just society and a lost faith in the ac!judicative process
that for many in the academy provided the raison d'etre of law
itself, of academic legal scholarship, and of their own participation in it; a growing malaise afflicting faculty and students caused
by a lack of any shared sense of law's moral purpose or point to
replace that declining faith; 111 despair among ethics professors and
constitutional lawyers over the use of law's forms-"legal memoranda," 'justice departments," "offices of legal counsel," and the
like-in the George W. Bush administration to promote the seemingly lawless ends of the most powerful leviathan on Earth 11 couplecl with the failure of the Obama administration to do anything
about it; increased calls from the academy to the academy to stop
doing "merely" normative, or "advocacy," or "doctrinal" scholarship, thus calling into question the point and even the existence of
what has been for almost a century the bread and butter of good
legal scholarship-because of all these factors, law school faculties, and therefore their students, find themselves in a profound
crisis of identity, all stemming from a sense that both the academy
and the profession it serves have been demoralized: they both selfavowedly lack a moral point. Briefly put, it's not clear anymore

The Umils ojProass
that this perhaps not-very-rcmunerati\'e-after-all profession for
which we train our students and which for some time now has not
been very much fun, either, is actually good for anything anymore,
or whether it eYer was, or whether it really is, as some skeptics hm·c
been saying for along time, nothing but a legitimating mask of an
increasingly insane and psychopathic sovereign beast. A little bit of
Rule of Law idealism-whether formal, procedural, or substanti\'e
-can't hurt, in such a climate, and it might help. It might help
make the case tor robust procedmal protections tor our prisoners
of our wars on terror abroad and on drugs here, it might help us
temper, or at least complement, the Rule of Law interpretations
that center profit with one that centers individual dignity and intelligence , and it might help us reclaim a sense of law's ennobling
purpose in the contemporary legal academy. All of that would be
terrific. I have no quarrel with the basic thrust of this prqject.
I do, though, have some objections-tour of them-which
I'll move through quickly and which I hope, if addressed, will
strengthen the prqject. All are in the nature of suggested friendly
amendments. My fifth and rmDor comment-not an ol~jection
quite-goes to some of the features of all three paradigms of Rule
of Law scholarship that \Naldron has usefully identified and distinguished: formal, procedural, and substantive. All three identify
the Rule of Law with a legalist impulse that mig-ht be used in a way
to blunt or counter the pernicious abuse of power by a too-fierce
state besotted by its own political will. This is not, I want to suggest,
an exhaustive account of our hopes for Law, in mediating the relationship between the individual and the state, nor should it be.
All three accounts, I will argue, ignore the ways in which the law
expresses the will of the state to protect weaker parties harmed not
by the state but by stronger private entities-employers, landlords,
union bosses, pri\'ate criminal gangs, oppressive church authorities, abusive parents or spouses, too-powerful private associations ,
and the like. This, too, should be a part of our theorizing over the
Rule of Law if that theorizing is intended to capture our ideals of
law, but it is almost routinely slighted in Rule of Law writing. And,
it is not addressed here, so I will urge. at the end of these comments, that we do so.
Let me start, though, with my objections. First. I'm confused
by Waldron's claim that there is no literature that expounds a
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procedural conception of the Rule of Law as it is presented here.
Owen Fiss, at Yale Law School, has devoted the better part of his
extremely fruitful career to doing just that. His highly regarded
leading casebook on civil procedure, 12 coauthored with Judith
Resnick, makes the two-thousand-page case for the moral value of
decent procedure, its centrality to the Rule of Law, and the role
of procedure in furthering the deeply foundational purpose Waldron identifies here-giving voice to each individual participant
in a way that treats him or her respectfully as an intelligent human being with a perspective that is worthy ofattention and that
must be heard. Fiss has also defended precisely this understanding
of the Rule of Law in an extensive body of writings stressing the
moral superiority of adjudication over alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods! 3 The virtue of traditional adjudication, Fiss
has argued, in contrast with ADR, is that it meets the imperative
of justice that the law must, through procedure, give litigants full
participation, an opportunity to voice their perspectives and views,
and a panoply of procedural and evidentiary rules designed to
protect that voice and participation. In fact, for Fiss, these procedural virtues are so central and so overriding-the opportunities
for intelligent participation presented by the procedural aspects
of adjudication so plentiful and profound-that they apparently
obviate the need for civil disobedience and even external moral
critique of law: there's virtually no claim, Fiss has asserted in his
most extreme version of this position, that can't be voiced in alegal register and aired in a court of law, so there is literally never a
basis for the anarchical claim that law can be reformed only from
outside, rather than from inside the system itself. 1·1 These proce~
dural values, furthermore, Fiss goes on to argue, constitute the
long-sought bridge between the ought and the is and thus undercut
legal positivism; to the extent that a legal system honors them, so
says Fiss, the system has real and not just moral authority! 5 It is the
source of a functional legal system's moral authority. This is an extreme version of the proceduralism Waldron wants us to recognize
here, and it is certainly not required by the proceduralism urged
here, but, nevertheless, even if overstated, Fissianjurisprudence is
a counterexample to Waldron's claim that law scholars have overlooked the important of procedural justice when thinking through
law's basic values.
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But it's not just the Yale proceduralists who get overlooked in
Waldron's claim that we've somehow neglected procedural values
in our thinking about the Rule of Law. Led by the Warren Court,
an entire generation of constitutional lawyers and thinkers, as well
as large swaths of legal scholarship, underwent a so-called due
process revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, itself fueled by a nearreligious faith in-at least a romance with-the purifying powers
of decent procedure. In a nutshell , that revolution was premised
on exactly the understanding of the Rule of Law expounded by
\Naldron here: justice, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the due
process clause, we all learned in those decades, all demand intelligent participation by individuals in the systems oflaw that impose
stigma, harm, liability, or punishment. The due process revolution
was real, not a dream-this is exactly what Gideon's trumpet was
trumpeting-and, although it is easy to fault it for giving poor
people an awful lot of procedure and very little substance-plenty
of rights, but no means to enjoy any of them; all sorts of venues to
voice complaints to a system unwilling to rectify the injustices that
prompted them-it did nevertheless rest on precisely the values
and even the vision that Waldron is calling for: a recognition that
human dignity requires that we be treated respectfully as intelligent participants in the machinations of government, particularly ·
when they are threatening us with stigma, harm, loss, liability, or
punishment. That revolution bore fruit. As a result of it, for example , although we have no right to welfare, we have a right not
to have our welfare benefits cut or taken from us without a decent
hearing. IIi We may not have a right to various social security benefits, but we have a (limited) right to a hearing that determines
what benefits we'll get or lose. 17 We may not have a right to various government jobs, but we have a right to a hearing before being sacked, 18 and, most famous, of course, pursuant to Gideon v.
Wainwright, 19 lionized in Anthony Lewis's Gideon's Trumpet, 20 a loving history of the case that was read for years by every entering law
student in "orientation weeks" of law school, we have a right to
a lawyer before being punished for violating the state's criminal
code. In almost a dozen cases, not just one or two, the Supreme
Court held during the heyday of this due process movement that,
while we may not have a right to some specified set of benefits,
we nevertheless have a right not to have them taken away without
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our having an opportunity to be heard. 21 It was that procedural
revolution, in fact, at least as much as Brown v. Board or Roe v. Wade,
that fueled an entire generation's outsize faith in the restorative
abilities of adjudicative law and the arguably disproportionate allocation of progressive resources given over to adjudicative constitutionalism-a development that Waldron has in other contexts,
along with others, cleplored.~2 But my point here is solely descriptive. Waldron's call to law professors that we need to attend to the
procedural rather than to the formal or substantive values of the
Rule of Law is a bit like raising the flag on the Fourth ofjuly and
exhorting the assembled crowd to attend to the neglected value
of patriotism. (Not entirely: it may well be that the professional
philosophical literature has neglected this dimension of the Rule
of Law, and it is of course that literature that is Waldron's target.
But almost.) Legal scholars of a certain generation, process jocks
all, most assuredly have not.
The second problem I want to highlight echoes the familiar contrast, in legal realist writings, of the difference between law on the
books and law on the streets. Waldron's piece is a contribution to
our legal ideals-an exploration of the values that we should hold
and that slwuld attend our legal system. As such, these legal ideals
are twice removed from the law on the streets: they are the ideals
that we should hold-not necessarily those we do hold, much less
put into practice in legal life. Nevertheless, they are not unrelated
to our extant ideals and find at least a dim echo in the practices of
the juvenile court judge and state prosecutor. Our ideals for law
must be derived at least in some way from our practice. Rule of
Law literature in particular attempts to articulate values that are
to some degree already imperfectly embedded in legal practice, as
well as values that ought to be. The same is true here: the ideal that
Waldron describes is by no means foreign to either our generally
held ideals or our practices. So, as is often the case with scholarship that explores values that partly emerge from practice but then
seeks to cleanly articulate them in order to both criticize and better guide that practice, Waldron's argument risks sugarcoating our
current practices. If we accept his argument, in other words, that
our Rule of Law scholarship is deficient in the way he suggests, because it doesn't reflect ideals embedded in practice, we might too
readily accept the claim that we respect these procedural values in
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practice far more than we actually do. After all, all we need to fix
to satisfy Waldron, so to speak, is the Rule of Law scholarship that
describes our practices, rather than the practices themselves. Then
we run the danger of just baldly refusing to see how far we have
moved from these ideals, whether stated or not. If we accept these
ideals as ideals we should hold, then we run the risk, in a word, of
hypocrisy-we don't do as we say we should do, even though what
we say we should do is based in part on what we claim to do. In
fact, the extent of that hypocrisy, particularly with respect to the
touted ideal of procedural justice in the criminal justice system in
this country, borders on the absurd.
In our scholarship and in popular culture-television shows
and the like-we extol as evidence of our appreciation of the
procedural virtues Waldron champions our insistence that every
criminal defendant in this country has a right to a lawyer, a right
to a day in court, and a right to a jury of his or her peers. That
defendant further enjoys a presumption of innocence, an extremely favorable burden of proof, and, in general, a panoply of
procedural and evidentiary rules that are so vividly stacked in his
or her favor that we can say, and often do with real pride, that in
this country at least, we prefer to risk the possibility that a hundred
guilty criminals will go free than risk the wrongful incarceration of
even one innocent. These values are so central, Waldron wants to
further claim, that they must be present in a legal system for that
system to claim the man tie of the Rule of Law. 23 And surely we have
a Rule of Law. We often use the phrase "Rule of Law" precisely to
describe the virtues of our system. But-if we have a Rule of Law
and if the Rule of Law protects precisely these values, then why are
the prisons so full? You'd think we'd have criminals roaming the
streets and relatively empty prisons. Yet, we have a massive crisis in
this country of ove1•incarceration. 24 Something must have gone very
badly wrong. More than 70 percent of the inmates in our federal
prisons got there without benefit of a trial. 25 They may have had a
1ight to a trial and a jury of their peers and a presumption of innocence and a stacked deck burden of proof in their favor, but something must have been lost in translation: the vast m.yority of defendants never see a jury. Rather, their cases are "plea bargained,"
meaning that, at most, the real rather than hypothetical inmates in
our prisons have had the opportunity to intelligently present their

40

ROBIN WEST

own story to their own lawyer in a quick fifteen-minute interview
prior to the recording of the bargain their lawyer recommends.
We should be very clear about this, as we tout the necessity of procedural virtues that require intelligent participation by all prior to
incarceration or other forms of stigma. We do not, in this country, accord those 'whom we arrest and incarcerate an opportunity
to intelligently participate in the process that led to their arrest,
conviction, or incarceration. We now have such massive overincarceration and absurdly high penalties, particularly for nonviolent
offenses, that were we to switch course-were we to provide a trial
and an opportunity to participate to each of these defendants we
threaten to incarcerate-the entire criminal justice system would
crash. At the so-called back-end, as well, we see the same pattern.
Limits on appeals and habeas petitions26 and the ever-expanding
universe of immunities of state actors, 27 from prosecutors and lawmakers down to the cops on the street, limit the opportunity to
air perspectives on the constitutionality of law enforcement in an
intelligent way in a court of law governed by fair procedures, quite
literally down to the vanishing point. We need to be careful not
to ground the insistence that the Rule of Law rests on procedural
values on our own practices when our own practices are so profoundly deficient,. unless we are happy to say forthrightly that our
own legal system does not abide by the Rule of Law. Arguing that
the Rule of Law requires procedural niceties without acknowledging those deficiencies, I believe, is an embarrassment, albeit an entirely avoidable one.
Third, we should acknowledge, before championing too loudly
the cause of proceduralism, that excessively precious procedures
in the face of grotesque substantive law from which there is truly
no exit, even with all the procedure in the world, can be a massive insult to dignity. So much so, that even the "winners lose," to
quote from one particularly poignant recent article documenting this phenomenon. 28 First of all, even the most just procedure
might simply be pointless. Guantanamo detainees, according
to one of their lawyers, don't much value a visit with a lawyer if
given the choice: visits with lawyers just lead to trouble, and even
their (substantial) procedural victories are often empty. The detainees know they aren't getting out no matter how welcome and
fair-minded the judicial rhetoric granting them all sorts of rights. 29
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Alternatively, and I think more pervasively, a litigant might well be
treated with the utmost procedural fairness, but the underlying law
might be so profoundly unjust that even just procedure becomes
a mockery or worse! One way to put the worry, perhaps, is that it
isn't clear that all that good procedure adds more injustice than it
costs in the legitimation it lends to the unjust regime or law. American antebellum courts in southern slave states decided, in open
court hearings that observed decent procedures, whether litigants
before them had enough drops of Negro blood before applying
their slave laws and depriving the pleaders before them of their
children, freedom, and husbands or wives. 30 Under these laws,
and no doubt in part because of just procedure, some individuals
were found not to be slaves and won some measure of freedom,
but how do we weigh the value of that just procedure? Courts in
Vichy France, Richard Weisberg has shown, acted with exquisitely
just procedures when determining whether a litigant had a jewish
ancestor of sufficiently close sanguinity to justify depriving him of
his livelihood or life under the Vichy "race laws. ":11 Do we applaud
their fidelity to principles of procedural justice? Israeli courts in
the 1950s, according to Raif Zeik, exhibited an outsize respect for
procedural justice when determining, with the utmost rectitude,
whether a small number of Palestinians had returned to their lifelong homes during "Freedom week"-a one-week period between
judicial orders when for legalistic reasons Palestinians actually enjoyed a right of return to one particular town-or whether their
return had occurred one moment before the designated week began or after it ended before deciding how or whether to apply the
Law of Exclusion. As the court said in one such case, "there's a
way to evict these people," and that way was in accordance with
proceduraljustice.:12 Defendants sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under three-strikes laws for· relatively petty and
nonviolent offenses might find the justice of the procedural rules
under which they are convicted to be quite generous-but they
might find that very generosity to be disorienting, a mighty distraction, or worse.:tl In Hell, as Grant Gilmore observed, there will be
perfect procedural justice.:14
Now, it seems on first blush arithmetically or trivially true that
application of these unjust laws under just procedures must lead to
less injustice than the same laws imposed under uruust procedural
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laws. Surely hell would be even more hellish if its unjust punishments were doled out in a procedurally unjust manner. But that
first blush might be misleading. The very procedural justice of the
trial, with its measured fairness, its appearance of rationality, its
veneer of civility, its modulated dialogue, its exquisitely tortured
rules of evidence, the apparent equality and equal regard with
which participants are treated, all lend a sense oflegitimacy as well
as finality to the entire proceeding. The procedural justice itself
sends a message of fairness as well as of the futility of resistance. In
an unjust regime-Vichy France's race laws, South Mrica's apartheid, the South's slave laws, California's three-strikes laws-the
very fairness and sense of rationality that Waldron applauds also
cleanses, to some degree, the injustice of the underlying law in the
eyes of observers, while underscoring, in a sense, perversely but
still underscoring, the totalizing violence of the law being enforced
against its victims. We can do this to you-and we can even do it
to you fairZv. in a way that everyone will agree is just. Procedural
justice is both a luxury of and a precondition of a confident legal
system-it evidences as well as effectuates a system that is beyond
challenge because it is beyond reproach. A fair system, after all,
ought not be challenged, and a strong enough system to risk the
victories against the state that are the inevitable byproduct of the
fairness-some defendants, after all, will flunk the one-drop rule,
some won't have a Jewish relative of sufficiently close sanguinity,
some Palestinians will be granted a right to return, and some black
South Africans will have their passes ruled intact, if these procedures are truly fair-is all the more likely to be a system that won't
be challenged, at least from within. Procedural justice, in other
words, can be demoralizing. After all, you had your day in court, so
what's to complain of? The procedural justice, then, strengthens
the system by legitimating it, all the more so in an unjust regime. If
that effect-the legitimizing effect, for short-is substantial, then
the procedural justice of a trial in an unjust regime may perversely
increase the overall injustice of the regime, making it all the more
invulnerable to change, whether through politics, revolution, or
subterfuge. A legal system that abides by the Rule of Law, where
the latter is defined by reference to procedural criteria, is not necessarily thereby more just. When it isn't, it's not clear where the
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value of all that procedure lies, other than in the fodder it provides modernist writers.
Fourth: justice, for a range of additional reasons that have long
been cited by the ADR movement3" but have also been noted in
some way ever since Bentham's broadsides, 36 may sometimes be
frustrated rather than furthered by an excess of procedure: when
procedures are overly technical; where they impose costs that
might outweigh their value, at least to individuals; when they require skilled players; where they strengthen the monopoly power
of lawyers and judges. Procedure can mask and then amplify,
rather than address, the power of judges and lawyers over lay
people's lives. Today, it's worth noting that when all that procedural justice is generously extended to corporations-rendered
''persons» by a compliant Supreme Court-it strengthens corporate power, as well, although perhaps by this point redundantly so.
All of these are reasons to treat procedural advances gingerly. The
first procedural justice revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century-the creation of the federal rules of civil procedure,
the invention of pretrial discovery, the innovations represented by
interrogatories, depositions, and so forth-may have been in part
motivated by the desire to lend transparency to a trial process that
otherwise resembled a Dorothy Sayers mystery more than an attempt to find the factual truth of the matter, but it has devolved
into something very different. It has become a means by which
monied corporate litigants and their lawyers can defeat individual
claimants through a barrage of costly motions. Privileges and immunities intended to shield the communications between embattled individual defendants and their lawyers in criminal courts of
la\v have become means by which corporate malfeasance is rendered all the more immune from state and, therefore, public control.'17 These are no.t isolated examples; they represent a systemic
problem. Procedures intended for the protection of beleaguered
and relatively powerless individuals threatened by an all-powerful
state, once generalized, become protections for the most powerful corporate actors against individuals who rightly seek the protection of the state or of state prosecutors seeking to restrain corporate power. Waldron's celebration of a procedural Rule of Law
makes no mention of any of this. The story is rather of a ferocious
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powerful state bent on exacting its will through punishment, censure, and the like, against a beleaguered individual, who seeks out
the protections of the Rule of Law. Litigants and defendants, however, can be more or less powerful, as can states, as can those interests on whose behalf states act.
Last: Waldron's procedural Rule of Law, like Fuller's formal
one and the libertarian's substantive one, presupposes a relation
between the individual and the state and a metaphorical narrative about that relation, which is just incomplete. On all three
accounts, substantive, formal, and procedural, the Rule of Law is
obviously a very good thing. It is law's humane face, sought by the
individual seeking protection against an act of power taken by a
potentially dangerous and overreaching state. The Rule of Law,
if we put these three models together, respectS individual intelligence, perspective, dignity, liberty, and agency, as well as entrepreneurial and cooperative projects. The state, and the state's action,
by contrast, is fraught with evil, unrestrained power, witlessness,
and violence. The state, after all, punishes, penalizes, renders liable, censures, stigmatizes, or harms, while the Rule of Law respects, frees, supports, and so on. The harmed individual in this
picture has dignitary and liberty interests that are first endangered
by the punishing state and then protected by law. The state, in this
scenario, is at best a necessary evil but at worst, when unrestrained
by law, an unrelenting nightmare. It is far more powerful than the
individual, and it has a license to inflict harm, stigma, punishment,
and liability. The Rule of Law, on all three accounts, is further a
very good thing because it can conceivably limit this unrestrained
power-on Waldron 's view, through decent procedure that requires that the state protect the individual's intelligence; on Fuller's, through formal rules that require that the state protect the
individual's liberty; and on the libertarian's substantive account,
through rules of property and contract that require that the state
protect the individual's particular projects and investments. The
unrestrained state, the power of a witless public in a functioning
democracy, is the problem solved by the Rule of Law: the political
state acts, and the Rule of Law protects the individual, his dignity
and his intelligence, against that pernicious state action by requiring that the state invite the individual's intelligent participation in
whatever proceeding the state contemplates in exacting its pound
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of flesh. The individual in this story has every reason to be fearful of the state. The individual likewise has every reason to welcome the intervention of Law so as to protect him from that state's
power.
There are familiar problems with this scenario. It overstates the
rationality and possibly the good will of courts and of law, as the
Critical Legal Studies movement argued a couple of decades back,
and it understates the capacity for public-minded and reasonable
deliberation by the lawmaking branches, as Jeremy Waldron has
argued now for several years. There is, though, a further limitation with this understanding of the Rule of Law: it presupposes
that the problem of power to which law is the solution is that of
the beleaguered individual pressing up against an overbearing sovereign state. But this is not the only problem of power to which
Jaw is or ought to be the solution. Rather, Jaw is, and I would suggest the Rule of Law is, perhaps quintessentially, the solution to
the problem of private power. Without a state that monopolizes
the weapons of force, any individual is vulnerable to the private
violent power of any other, as Hobbes witnessed, and with decreasing public control of guns in this country we increasingly witness
likewise. Without a state that regulates, somewhat, against the vagaries of fate and intergenerational family loyalty, an individual is
vulnerable to the outsized economic power of another, whether
that power is itself a function of genetic luck, social history, or inheritance. Without a state that guards against and compensates,
through its law, fraud, bad faith, · duress, negligence, breach of
contracts, breach of fiduciary duties, and so on, an individual is
buttressed by the tendency, not of states but of private actors, to
stigmatize, inflict harm, punish, and the like. It's worth noting that
this power of law-the power to intervene into the undue exercise
of private power-serves a foundationally progressive function.
But there is nothing of this function of law and nothing of this
in the· articulation of law's ideals in most Rule of Law scholarship,
including Jeremy Waldron's latest intervention. This is, I think,
mightily odd. This is, after all, the Rule of Law we're talking about,
and a lot of our laws are about protecting individuals against the
undue aggressions of other individuals or corporations, not only
through the criminal law hut through much of private law as well.
This purpose, in other words, is right at the heart of law's point.
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But this understanding of law's point is somehow invisible in contemporary Rule of Law scholarship. Rather, the kind of law that is
regarded as the point of the "law" that is referenced in the phrase
"Rule of Law" is not our ordinary criminal law, tort law, and the
rest of it that so clearly serve something like this function. Rather,
it is a higher law-a constitutional law for some, a procedural law
for others, a law of process maybe, a law of laws-that acts as a
constraint, rhetorically, on the state and on pernicious state actors,
as well as on the low-level law (criminal, contract, tort, and so on)
that is the product of state action. That low-level law, apparently, is
guided not by any deals we might have that are embraced imperfectly or not by our "Rule of Law" scholarship but rather by political whim. The higher law that constrains the state and ordinary law
is what embodies the ideals expressed in Rule of Law scholarship.
The consequence of this division of labor is that a good bit of
both our ideals for law and our practice is left out of the procedural, formal, and substantive ideal. First, and most striking, plaintiffs are left out. Waldron's procedural Rule of Law profects criminal and civil defendants-persons who find themselves ensnared
in legal process against their will and against their wishes-against
the tendency of the state to sanction, punish, impose liability, and
so on. It does not protect plaintiffs-those who seek out legal process and legal protection, those who quite willfully attempt to invoke.
the powers of the state to protect them against the tendency of
private actors-would-be defendants-to breach contracts, commit torts, or kill people, and the tendency, sometimes, of states to
be complicit in those acts through a selectively willful failure to facilitate legal action against those private actors. Consequently, Waldron's procedural Rule of Law does not protect plaintiffs in court,
against, for example, the immunities of various actors-not only
prosecutors and police officers but also church officials or spouses
or parents or charities-from liability or against rules of evidence
designed to protect various "privileges" that drastically limit the liability of entire classes of defendants. His procedural Rule of Law
does not protect would-be plaintiffs against various limiting doc·
trines, such as preemption, or limits imposed on entire classes of
damages, such as pain and suffering awards, that place the public
venue of the courtroom out of reach for the articulation of various
sorts of injuries. Rather, it seemingly presupposes a body of private
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law and criminal law that either perfectly protects or overly protects victims of crime and would-be plaintiffs against private wrong
and then enforces these regimes in an unjustifiably heavy-handed
manner against beleaguered defendants. Plaintiffs, in this imagining, are aligned with the state-the private attorneys general, so
to speak-and become part of the state machinery in need of restraint by the idealized procedures of the Rule of Law.
More fundamental, Waldron's idealized Rule of Law, like the
idealized rules of law that he is criticizing, does not contain even
a hint of a reference to law's protective function. Law does a lot of
things, but one of its core functions is to protect individuals against
what would otherwise be undeterred privations against them-not
by overreaching state officials but rather by undeterred private
individuals, corporations, or entities. Law does, as Waldron says,
stigmatize, punish, impose liability, and so on. Law also, though,
compensates individuals for private wrongs and protects them at
least much of the time against private violence. Sometimes it does
this well, and sometimes it does it only sporadically or not at all. In
my view, a society that claims to regulate conduct under the ideal
of the Rule of Law-as opposed to the rule of the stronger, or the
rule of the more mendacious, or the rule of the more richly endowed, or the rule of the more vindictive, or the more manipulative, or the more fraudulent, or the more violent and so forth
-should, seemingly, require that law do as much. Rule of Law
scholarship, then, one would think, should reflect these ideals.
But it doesn't, and it's worth asking why not? The phrase "rule
of law" is obviously a metaphor-it is intended to reference the
ideals we hold and should hold for actual legal systems. Presumably, an ideal legal system will target private wrongs as a problem
of power that law should address. Yet, Rule of Law scholarship routinely fails to do so. One reason for this neglect may be that Rule
of Law scholars share a two-step background narrative about both
the state's and law's metaphoric beginnings. Individuals first create a state with a monopoly over violence to protect them from
one another. The state then fashions criminal law, tort law, and the
like in order to do so. That's step one. The state, however, then
becomes dangerously powerful and itself must be constrained.
So, we then create higher law-procedural law, constitutional law,
and so on-to protect us against the state. That's step two. The
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"Rule of Law" then becomes a metaphoric reference to the ideals
we hold for those higher forms of law. The work of the state, then,
is to control private conduct and private abuse of power through
ordinary law. The work of the Rule of Law, by contrast, is to restrain the state from undue enforcement of the lower laws that
are in turn intended to restrain individuals. The state constrains
individuals through ordinary law. The Rule of Law constrains the
state. Some other mechanism-maybe democratic accountability,
maybe just conscience-prompts the promulgation of those laws
intended to restrain private conduct, including prompting their
creation where the state can't really be bothered.
The metaphor, however, is just that, and the narrative bears no
relation to the actual creation of states, laws, higher laws, constitutions, or codes of procedure. If we scrap metaphor and narrative
and simply ask what sorts of ideals our legal systems should strive
to meet, I believe we get a richer and more complete picture than
the metaphor and narrative implicit in Rule of Law scholarship
yield. Minimally, such a picture would include, as current Rule of
Law scholarship does not, acknowledgeme·n t of what we aim to do
with law, not only what we aim to prohibit law from doing. And a
part of what we aim to do with law, at least some of the time, is to
prohibit abuses of private power or to provide a means by which
conflicts over private power can be aired. This requires not only
prohibiting the state from "stigmatizing, harming, punishing or
imposing liability" without fair process. It also requires the state to
compensate, deter, and retribute where need be and to monopolize the use of force. We want, from a liberal state that abides by
the Rule of Law, not only a legal system that won 't impose its will
against us without respecting our intelligence and seeking out our
participation. We also want, from a liberal state that abides by the
Rule of Law, some measure of safety in our homes and neighborhoods against private violence, some measure of fairness in our
commercial dealings, and some measure of wellbeing in our private lives, free of the privations of more powerful private actors.
This is an omission that matters. The stigma, punishment, harm,
and so on that threaten the enjoyment of the lives of many people,
all of which Waldron identifies as coming from state power, at least
on occasion come not from states but ti·om powerful nonstate entities. Part of the point of law is to do something about that. It has
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been recognized by liberal theorists of the state from Hobbes to
Rawls that the state, far from being nothing but a ferocious evil in
people's lives that needs constraining, can also be a force for domestic peace, for equality, and for a generally high level of social
wellbeing, precisely by virtue of ensuring, through lawful process,
that the state successfully monopolize the use of force and by being a generally equalizing participant in the battle over the allocation of private power. We should, I believe, construct our ideals for
law-which is what I take Rule of Law scholarship as attempting to
do-in a way that incorporates these realities and these hopes for
Law's reach. Doing so, I think, calls not for modification of any of
the three paradigms, all of which can be read conjunctively, but
for the construction of a fourth . It is not incompatible with Jeremy
·waldron's proceduralism, just as his proceduralism is not at bottom inconsistent with Fuller's formalism and just as Fuller's formalism is not inconsistent with substantive accounts of the Rule of
Law that prioritize the protection of private property. It may, however, be in tension, at points, with all of them. So, I would just issue
this plea for a more robust understanding of our legalist ideals.
If v:e are going to talk about our ideals for legalism through the
metaphor of the Rule of Law, we should expand that conversation
so that it includes our ideals regarding not only what the state may
not do without decent procedure but also what it must do with its
law if we are to enjoy the intelligence and perspectives that we all
possess and that Waldron's procedural Rule of Law, to its credit,
aims to protect.
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